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Introduction 
 
The EU has positioned itself as a key actor in the regulation of lifestyle risks,1 in 
particular in the fight against tobacco consumption. This figures prominently in the 
EU health program 2014-2020 which seeks ‘to promote health, prevent diseases, 
and foster supportive environments for healthy lifestyles […] by addressing in 
particular the key lifestyle related risk factors with a focus on the Union added 
value’,2 among which ‘tobacco use and passive smoking’.3 Familiar aspects of anti-
tobacco policies are regulated at the EU level, from the well-known ‘Smoking kills’ 
label to the prohibition of tobacco advertising on radio and television, via two main 
instruments: the Tobacco Products Directive,4 which regulates the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco, and the Tobacco Advertising Directive5, which 
relates to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. 
 
From a public health point of view, the action of the EU is relatively uncontroversial. 
But its legality and the existence of an EU prerogative to adopt tobacco control 
measures have been fiercely disputed. These measures have been subjected to 
numerous challenges, most recently with the judgements Philip Morris6 and Poland v 
Parliament and Council,7 rendered by the Court in 2016. Central to these disputes is 
the use of the harmonisation powers contained in Article 114 TFEU,8 making up for 
the limited competence of the EU in public health9 and the impossibility to adopt 
harmonisation measures in this area.10 Article 114 TFEU concerns the approximation 
of laws necessary to the establishment and functioning of the internal market and is 
essentially a trade-oriented disposition, at least under the Court’s current appraisal. 
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1 Alemanno A. and Garde A. (eds.), Regulating Lifestyle Risks: The EU, Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Unhealthy Diets, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015; Alemanno A. and Garde A., ‘The 
emergence of an EU lifestyle policy: the case of alcohol, tobacco and unhealthy diets’, (2013), Common 
Market Law Review, 50, 1745-1786. 
2 Regulation 282/2014 on the establishment of a third Programme for the Union's action in the field of 
health (2014-2020), art. 3(1). 
3 Ibid., Annex I, 1.1.  
4 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 
2001/37/EC, (OJ 2014, L 127, p. 1). 
5 Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the 
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, (OJ 2003, L 152, p.16). 
6 Case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL e.a. v Secretary of State for Health, 4 May 2016, 
EU:C:2016:325. 
7 Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council, 4 May 2016, EU:C:2016:323. 
8 Article 114(1) TFEU enables the EU to ‘adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market’. 
9 Public health is categorised as a complementary competence for which the EU can only ‘carry out 
actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member states’ (art. 6 TFEU). 
10 Article 168(5) TFEU excludes ‘any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’.  
  
Its use in the context of tobacco control raises crucial legal questions that this 
contribution proposes to investigate. 
 
Legal scholarship on the (ab)use of Article 114 TFEU as an indirect legal basis is 
abundant, especially in relation to the ‘competence creep’ issue.11 The present 
contribution aims at reconsidering the problem and addressing a somewhat 
neglected issue: the impossibility under the current competence framework to 
conduct a fully-fledged and coherent tobacco control policy. In a first section, the use 
of internal market legislation to advance public health objectives will be examined. It 
will be submitted that the practice does not raise any legal problem as such, but is 
however conceptually dishonest and illustrates very well the lack of clarity of the EU 
constitutional order. A second section will analyse in detail the policy options offered 
by this indirect competence. It will appear that the lack of direct competence to 
regulate tobacco limits these options and prevents further developments. We are 
therefore confronted to a paradoxical situation in which the EU is allowed too much 
and too little at the same time.  
 
1. Too much regulation ? Tobacco from a constitutional standpoint. 
 
1.1. The necessity to integrate public health in internal market legislation 
 
The Tobacco Products Directive and the Tobacco Advertising Directive are both 
based on Article 114 TFEU.12 The use of this disposition to pursue non-market 
objectives has been extensive13 and somewhat lightly reviewed by the Court of 
Justice, an approach for which it has received numerous criticisms.14 Some of those 
criticisms are well-founded, as will be shown in the second section, but should not 
overshadow the fact that the integration of autonomous and separate policy 
objectives in internal market legislation is perfectly legitimate. Such is the case of 
public health.  
 
Public health must be included in Union policies in general, and in internal market 
legislation in particular. According to Article 9 TFEU: ‘in defining and implementing its 
policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the 
promotion of a […] high level of education, training and protection of human health’. 
Article 168(1) TFEU further adds that ‘a high level of human health protection shall 
be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities’. 
Finally and specifically in relation to the internal market, Article 114(3) TFEU states 
that ‘the Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, 
                                                          
11 See Dashwood A., ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’, (1996), European Law Review, 
21(2), 113-128; De Burca G. and De Witte B., ‘The delimitation of powers between the EU and its 
Member States’ in Arnull A. and Wincott D. (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 202 et s.; Weatherill S., ‘Better competence monitoring’, 
(2005), European Law Review, 30(1), 23-41; Dougan M., ‘Legal developments’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, (2010), 48, 163–181. 
12 These two directives are also based on articles 53(1) and 62 TFEU. These articles are assessed by 
the Court together with article 114 TFEU and will therefore not be analysed specifically in the following 
developments. See case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council, C-376/98, 5 October 
2000, EU:C:2000:544. 
13 See De Witte B., ‘A competence to protect: the pursuit of non-market aims through internal market 
legislation’, in Syrpis P., The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 25-46; ‘Non-market values in internal market legislation’, in, 
Shuibhne N. (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006, 61-86. 
14 See Weatherill S. ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How 
the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide” ’, German Law Journal, (2011), (12)3, pp. 827-
864; Wyatt D., ‘Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market’, University of Oxford Faculty of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, (2007), Working Paper No 9/2007, 1-46.  
  
safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high 
level of protection’. There are therefore strong legal grounds for the inclusion of 
public health objectives in internal market legislation, which was recognised by the 
Court in the landmark Tobacco Advertising judgement where it stated that ‘provided 
that the conditions for recourse to Articles [114, 53(1) and 62 TFEU] as a legal basis 
are fulfilled, the Community legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal 
basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to 
be made’.15 The Court polices the fulfilment of these conditions but refuses to limit 
the range of objectives that can be pursued by the legislator. 
 
This interpretation is in line with the logic of Article 114 TFEU itself. It is a purposive - 
or functional - legal basis, to the difference of sector specific legal bases which 
empower the EU in relation to a particular field. Such a provision expresses an 
objective, the establishment and the functioning of the internal market, and gives 
mandate to the EU to attain it.16 As Advocate General Fennelly says, this 
competence ‘is not limited in advance by reference to a particular subject-matter 
defined ratione materiae’.17 It is only logic that in exercising it the EU will touch upon 
many different areas, because the economic and the non-economic are always 
closely intertwined. This was actually foreseen by the Treaty drafters since they 
inserted limits to the reach of Article 114 TFEU in its second paragraph, which shelter 
fiscal provisions, the free movement of persons and the rights and interests of 
employed persons from harmonisation measures.18 It should be noted that public 
health is not part of these exclusions but rather, as mentioned above, specifically 
included via its paragraph three. 
  
Lastly, if the Court were not to follow this approach and were to restrict the action of 
the Union legislator solely to economic purposes, this would have problematic 
political consequences. Such an approach would mean that harmonisation can only 
be done by the deregulation of national markets,19 a deregulation already supported 
by the sweeping approach adopted by the Court in its interpretation of the four 
freedoms of movement.20 A wide competence granted to the legislator is necessary 
to re-regulate the Union markets and try to keep the balance between negative and 
positive integration in the EU.21 
 
Are there limits to this approach? The Court considers that non-market objectives 
can be ‘decisive’ in the adoption of a measure but does not expressly tell us whether 
the market objective should be as decisive or not. But decisive should probably be 
                                                          
15 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 12, para 88. 
16 For a critical approach towards purposive legal bases, see Davies G., ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in 
the Shadow of Purposive Competence’, (2015), European Law Journal, 21(1), pp. 2-22.  
17 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council, 
15 June 2000, EU:C:2000:324, para. 62. See also Davies G., supra note 16, p. 3: ‘However, a defining 
characteristic of pure purposive power is that while it is constrained to follow specific goals, it is not 
constrained in the subject matter or the breadth of its impact’.  
18 Article 114(2) TFEU: ‘Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free 
movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons’. 
19 See the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and Others v 
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 1 October 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:596, para 8. 
20 For the need for the Court to revise its approach, see Barnard C. ‘Restricting restrictions: lessons for 
the EU from the US’, (2009), Cambridge Law Journal, 68(3), 575-606.  
21 See Garben S. ‘Confronting the Competence Conundrum: Democratising the European Union 
through an Expansion of its Legislative Powers’, (2015), Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35(1), 75-76. 
This is even more important if one considers, as pointed by Sacha Garben, that re-regulation through 
positive integration is in itself difficult ‘due to the high majority thresholds needed to pass legislation and 
the great diversity of national systems and views.’, ibid., p. 75 note 81. 
  
understood as predominant, as it would be hard not to consider public health as the 
main objective for the adoption of the directives on tobacco. These instruments were 
not adopted to facilitate the business-making of the tobacco industry.  
 
One limit could be found in the constitutional doctrine of the ‘centre of gravity’, 
according to which : ‘if examination of a Community act shows that it has a twofold 
purpose or twofold component and if one of these is identifiable as main or 
predominant, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be founded on a 
sole legal basis, that is, the one required by the main or predominant purpose or 
component’.22 Following this approach, other interests could be integrated into 
market legislation as long as they remain of a lesser ‘weight’ than the market 
component of the measure. This is not, however, the line of reasoning chosen by the 
Court in the Tobacco Advertising case, where it did not engage in a debate over the 
respective importance of the internal market and public health objectives, contrary to 
what Germany had suggested in its plea.23 It is not entirely clear why the Court made 
this choice and the application of the centre of gravity doctrine to Article 114 TFEU 
deserves some more detailed developments.  
 
In Tobacco Advertising, Advocate General Fennelly considered that the ‘centre of 
gravity’ doctrine should only be applied in cases where all the competing legal bases 
allow for harmonisation. 24 It was not the situation in the case at hand since Article 
168 TFEU, contrary to Article 114 TFEU, did not allow for any harmonisation in the 
field of public health. According to him, no balance should therefore be made 
between the two legal bases.25 But the Court did not formally endorse this view in its 
own decision and has up to date never clarified this point.26 
 
In a subsequent case, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council,27 the Court followed 
another reasoning. The litigant considered that Directive 98/44 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions had been wrongfully adopted under Article 114 TFEU 
since its principle aim was industrial development and scientific research, and should 
have been adopted under Articles 173 and 179 TFEU (then 157 and 163 EC). 28 It is 
doubtful that these articles would have been suitable legal bases for the adoption of 
harmonisation measures, but the Court nonetheless decided to make a balance 
between the different interests at stake. It said that the aim of the directive was 
indeed to ‘promote research and development in the field of genetic engineering in 
the European Community’ but that ‘the way in which it does so is to remove the legal 
obstacles within the single market that are brought about by differences in national 
legislation and case-law’.29 ‘[A]pproximation of the legislation of the Member States is 
therefore not an incidental or subsidiary objective of the Directive but is its essential 
purpose’.30 This distinction between the aim and the effect of a measure is confusing 
and unfortunate,31 but this balancing could mean that the Court accepts to apply the 
                                                          
22 Case C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd et Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 10 December 2002, EU:C:2002:741, para 94. 
23 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 12 , para 32-35.  
24 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 17 
para. 68-69. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Bruno de Witte considers that the Court upheld the view of AG Fennelly in the Tobacco Advertising 
judgement. However, this does not clearly appear in the text of the decision. See Bruno de Witte, supra 
note 13, respectively p.35 and p. 75.  
27 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v European Parliament and Council, 9 October 2001, EU:C:2001:523. 
28 Ibid., para. 26.  
29 Ibid., para 27.  
30 Ibid., para 28.  
31 See De Witte B., ‘Non-market values in internal market legislation’, supra note 13, p.73 note 37. 
  
‘center of gravity’ test also to situations where Article 114 TFEU is the only legal 
basis available. 
 
In any case, the position defended by Advocate General Fennelly in Tobacco 
Advertising appears problematic. It would be quite paradoxical to limit the reach of 
Article 114 TFEU when the competence to adopt an act exists elsewhere in the 
Treaty but to give licence to the EU to legislate in fields where no such competence 
exists. This denies the very purpose of legal bases, which is to protect Member 
States and individuals from the action of the EU in fields where it has not been 
entrusted with powers.32 
 
Another distinction should rather be made. The ‘center of gravity’ cannot and should 
not be applied to situations where the market objective of a harmonisation measure 
is being put in balance with another objective which is the subject-matter of the 
harmonisation in question.33 It is the reasoning that the Court followed in the Titanium 
Dioxide case. Asked to arbitrate between Article 114 TFEU and Article 192 TFEU on 
the environment (then Article 130s EEC) the Court found that the directive at issue 
was ‘concerned, indissociably, with both the protection of the environment and the 
elimination of disparities in conditions of competition.’34 The market and the 
environmental objectives could not be separated from one another and Article 114 
TFEU therefore constituted the appropriate legal basis.35 As Advocate General 
Fennelly recognised himself, in this case ‘the Court examined the objective 
conditions for legislation on the basis of Article [114 TFEU] without regard to the 
relative ‘weight’ of the internal market and environmental aspects of the legislative 
scheme’.36 Such an interpretation seems more in line with the fundamental dual 
nature of Article 114 TFEU. This disposition is indeed ‘intended for the adoption of 
measures which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market but those measures replace State measures that pursue a variety of 
regulatory goals of the market’.37 The market objective and the other regulatory 
objective cannot be severed and are necessarily of the same weight, at least legally. 
The legislator may very well be primarily, or solely, concerned with the non-market 
objective, this is a political assessment that is not of the Court’s concern.38 
 
It is however different to weigh the internal market objective of a measure against 
other objectives that are independent from the national law being harmonised,39 or to 
contest the existence of the internal market objective in the provisions of a 
measure.40 In these situations, the application of the ‘center of gravity’ test makes 
sense because the various objectives at stake are not inseparable. 
 
                                                          
32 Barents R., ‘The internal market unlimited: some observations on the legal basis of Community 
legislation’, (1993), Common Market Law Review, 85-109, p. 92.  
33 Ibid., p. 101. 
34 Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, 11 June 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, para 13. 
35 Ibid., para 22-24.  
36 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 17 
para 68.  
37 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, supra note 19, para 1. 
38 See Barents R., supra note 32, p. 101; Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Germany v European 
Parliament and Council, supra note 17 para. 75; Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, case C-
491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd 
et Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 10 September 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:476, para 100. 
39 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd et 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd, supra note 22, para 92-97.  
40 See Case C-155/91, Commission. v. Council, 17 March 1993, EU:C:1993:98. 
  
To conclude on this point, it appears that the Court does not assess the relative 
importance of the public health and the internal market objectives when assessing 
the validity of tobacco harmonisation measures. It is the appropriate position if one 
considers the dual nature of Article 114 TFEU, even if the exact rationale for the 
Court’s position remains unclear. What the Court focuses its analysis on is the 
fulfilment of the conditions for the use of Article 114 TFEU, that the measure in 
question effectively pursues the internal market objective. These conditions will be 
analysed further in section 2.  
 
1.2. The discrepancies in the EU constitutional framework 
 
Even if there is no legal objection to the recourse to Article 114 TFEU to regulate 
tobacco consumption at the EU level, the result is nevertheless problematic when the 
broader EU constitutional framework is considered. This legislative practice appears 
in blatant contradiction with the current division of competence whereby public health 
is only a complementary competence, and with the wording of Article 168(5) TFEU 
prohibiting any harmonisation in this field. ‘In fact, Article 114 makes a mockery of the 
carefully drawn restrictions in provisions such as Article 168.’41 It also sits uneasily 
with the principle of conferral expressed at Article 5 TEU.42 Of course, the meaning of 
Article 168(5) is clear to an EU lawyer: the Union cannot harmonise laws having 
health as a subject-matter unless this makes at the same time a contribution to the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market. But this is probably far less 
clear to any citizen trying to have a clear picture of the areas where the EU can act. 
 
This contradiction illustrates an incoherence that goes deeper in the Treaties system. 
It reveals the ambiguity of the European Union as a federal project and the lack of 
clarity of the division of competences between the EU and its Member States, 
despite the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.43 The idea of categorizing 
competences in different policy areas with specific legal basis goes against the 
purposive nature of Article 114 TFEU.44 This contradiction is rooted in a more 
fundamental debate over the EU constitutional model which was perfectly expressed 
by the Laeken Declaration: ‘Lastly, there is the question of how to ensure that a 
redefined division of competence does not lead to a creeping expansion of the 
competence of the Union […] How are we to ensure at the same time that the 
European dynamic does not come to a halt? In the future as well the Union must 
continue to be able to react to fresh challenges and developments’.45 The answer to 
this question has yet to be found. 
 
In the same way, the current constitutional framework does not constitute a clear 
choice between dual or cooperative federalism.46 The logic of complementary 
competences ‘represents, in itself, a constitutional choice in favour of cooperative 
                                                          
41 Weatherill S., The Internal Market as a Legal Concept, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 171.  
42 Article 5(2) TEU: ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’ 
43 It is now widely accepted that the Lisbon reforms have, at best, failed to bring this clarity. See Garben 
S., supra note 21.  
44 See Azoulai L., ‘The question of competence’, in Azoulai L. (ed.), The Question of Competence in the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 11 : ‘[…] there is no doubt that changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty contain a direct challenge to the predominant functional and 
constitutional conceptions of the European legal order of the last 50 years.’ 
45 Laeken declaration on the future of the European Union, Presidency conclusions, European Council 
meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 december 2001, p. 22. 
46 Schütze R., From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
  
federalism’47 whereby the Union and member States support each other’s action to 
attain their policy objectives. It furthers the disappearance of areas of exclusive 
power for member States. But at the same time, the introduction of a ban on 
harmonisation for these competences drastically reduces the possibility for the EU to 
legislate, making these areas formally exclusive from EU intervention. 48 This 
prohibition of harmonisation is a purely dual clause inserted in a cooperative 
framework. It is thus unsurprising that this schizophrenic approach to complementary 
competences led to the intensive recourse by the Union to Article 114 TFEU to deal 
with these policies. This choice can be qualified as ‘cynical’49 insofar ‘the Community 
legislator may need to justify politically desired European “health measures” by 
means of the economic vocabulary of the internal market’.50 This is exactly what can 
be found in the current legislative practice. 
 
It is clear that the tobacco policy of the EU is a public health policy and that market 
integration plays an extremely limited role in its adoption at the political level. How 
could it be different ? These rules are directly aimed at reducing and ultimately 
eradicating tobacco consumption and not at helping the tobacco industry to enjoy 
better trading conditions, and are adopted despite the inexistence of any formal 
competence. It is this discrepancy that should fuel the competence creep worry, 
more than the actual content of the measures adopted under Article 114 TFEU.  
 
2. Too little? Tobacco from a public health standpoint. 
 
The conditions set out by the Court for the recourse to Article 114 TFEU are twofold: 
the measure must removes obstacles to freedom of movement – obstacles to trade – 
or distortions of competition.51 Once this ‘internal market test’52 is fulfilled, the public 
health aspect of the measure becomes irrelevant. This may look like a low threshold, 
but it limits the range of policy options available to the EU legislator if taken 
seriously.53 In this perspective, public health finds itself curtailed by Article 114 TFEU, 
as a detailed analysis of the actual EU anti-tobacco policy and its potential 
developments will show. 54 
 
2.1. The internal market test: what are obstacles to trade and distortions of 
competition ?  
 
In order to determine if a given measure passes the internal market test, the 
concepts of obstacles to trade and distortions of competition must first be clarified.  
 
Appreciable distortions of competition 
 
The Court has specified that the distortions of competition removed by a given 
measure needed to be ‘appreciable’ in order to fulfil the conditions of Article 114 
                                                          
47 Ibid., p. 269. 
48 Ibid., p. 282. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., p. 283. 
51 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 12, para 84, 95. 
52 This expression is borrowed from Bruno de Witte: ‘A competence to protect: the pursuit of non-market 
aims through internal market legislation’, supra note 13, p. 36. 
53 Subsidiarity and proportionality also represent limits to the action of the EU. Their role in internal 
market legislation is particularly important and deserves developments that go beyond the scope of the 
present reflection. 
54 This analysis is done de lege lata and would lead to a different outcome if another interpretation of 
article 114 TFEU were to prevail.  
  
TFEU.55 It is so because, as rightfully pointed by the Court, any difference in 
legislation between member States can be considered as distorting competition 
between undertakings.56 For this condition to be meaningful, it was necessary to limit 
the reach of Article 114 TFEU to situations where the distortion was particularly 
problematic. Otherwise, ‘the powers of the Community legislature would be 
practically unlimited.’57 
 
The Court has never defined clearly what appreciable was supposed to mean in this 
context and the guidance to be found in the case-law is scarce. In Tobacco 
Advertising, the Court said that differences in legislation that would put some actors 
‘at an advantage in terms of economies of scale and increase in profits’ would be too 
remote and indirect to constitute appreciable distortions of competition.58 This 
contrasts with the differences at stake in the Titanium Dioxide case which affected 
the production costs in the titanium dioxide industry,59 or differences between 
regulations leading to the relocation of economic activities in another member 
State,60 both deemed appreciable by the Court. In the Vodafone case, the Court also 
held that divergent national laws regarding roaming charges could be considered as 
significant distortions of competition.61 Here as well, the difference in roaming 
charges can affect significantly the production costs of the service provider. We also 
know from Tobacco Advertising that the notion of distortions of competition does not 
include restrictions on forms of competition applying to all economic operators in a 
Member State,62 which means that there is an inherent dimension of inequality in the 
concept of distortions of competition.63  
 
It derives from this that an appreciable distortion of competition, or at least an 
example of it, could be a difference in productions costs affecting adversely the 
different economic operators on the market. 
 
Obstacles to trade 
 
The notion of obstacles to trade is clearer. Several cases dealing with Article 114 
TFEU provide examples of the different types of rules falling into that category and 
can be used as a benchmark to assess other measures. Should the concept of 
‘restriction’ under the fundamental freedoms of movement also constitute a 
yardstick? That would be logical if one considers the functional link established by 
the Court between negative and positive integration.64 Harmonisation is used to 
eliminate the regulatory differences that cannot be overcome by mutual recognition. 
The Court itself refers to its case-law under Article 34 TFEU to identify obstacles to 
trade in national legislation in cases dealing with Article 114 TFEU.65 Hence, leaving 
aside the question of whether the two concepts of obstacle and restriction can be 
                                                          
55 Germany v European Parliament and Council, C-376/98, supra note 12, para 106. 
56 Ibid. p 107; see also Davies G., ‘Can selling arrangements be harmonized?’, (2005), European Law 
Review, 30(3), 371-385, p. 372 : ‘almost any national rule has an impact on economic activity, and 
differences between such rules will therefore create relative advantages and disadvantages for 
industries in different states’, p. 373; Dashwood A., supra note 11, p. 121.  
57 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 12, para 107. 
58 Ibid., para 109. 
59 Ibid.; Commission v. Council, supra note 34, para 12. 
60 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 12, para 110. 
61 Case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, 8 June 2010, EU:C:2010:321, para 47.  
62 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 12, para 113.  
63 Davies G., supra note 56, p. 373. 
64 Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 20 February 1979, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, para 8.  
65 See British American Tobacco, supra note 22, para 64; Tobacco Advertising II para 57. 
  
fully equated, 66 it is possible to say with a certain degree of certainty that the former 
comprises the latter. 
 
In the case of free movement goods, which is the freedom at stake in most of 
tobacco regulation, one can rely on the three tests given by the Court of Justice to 
define a restriction:67 product requirements imposed on a foreign product that has 
already complied with its home regulation,68 selling arrangements that do not ‘apply 
to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and […] affect in the same 
manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other 
Member States’ 69 and other measures which hinders the access of foreign products 
to the market of a Member State.70 
 
2.2. The internal market as a limit to public health 
 
Before analysing in detail some of the possibilities open to the European legislator in 
tobacco regulation, it is important to bear in mind that Article 114 TFEU seeks the 
removal of obstacles to trade and distortions of competition. This means that it is not 
enough to identify obstacles or distortions arising from divergences in national 
legislations to establish the competence under 114 TFEU. The EU measure must 
actually eliminate these divergences. It is this requirement especially that makes 
Article 114 TFEU unsuitable to adopt certain public health measures, since these 
cannot be considered as removing obstacles to trade or distortions of competition. 
 
Product requirements 
 
EU tobacco regulation focuses mostly on the product itself, which can be explained 
both by the importance of such rules for public health and the fact that they fit 
particularly well the internal market test necessary for their legality under Article 114 
TFEU. The Tobacco Products Directive has put in place strict rules on the 
conditioning of tobacco products, harmonising for instance the shape of unit packets, 
the minimum number of cigarettes contained and the size of health warnings that 
packets must carry. Each unit packet and any outside packaging must for instance 
carry a general warning, ‘Smoking kills – quit now’ or ‘Smoking kills’, and the 
information message ‘Tobacco smoke contains over 70 substances known to cause 
cancer’, both covering 50% of the surface on which they are printed.71 
 
These types of product requirements undoubtedly fulfil the conditions for recourse to 
Article 114 TFEU. They are clearly obstacles to trade, as expressed by the Court in 
British American Tobacco : ‘national rules laying down the requirements to be met by 
products, in particular those relating to their designation, composition or packaging, 
are in themselves liable, in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, to 
constitute obstacles to the free movement of goods’,72 in line with its interpretation of 
Article 34 TFEU.73 Having a common standard for the composition of tobacco 
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68 Cassis De Dijon, supra note 64. 
69 Case C-267/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, 
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71 Article 9 of the Tobacco Product Directive (TPD), supra note 4. 
72 British American Tobacco, supra note 22, para 64.  
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products and their packaging helps removing these obstacles and is beneficial to the 
free circulation of these products throughout the internal market. These rules can 
therefore be harmonised.  
 
Not all aspects of the packaging of tobacco products is regulated by the Tobacco 
Products Directive, so member States retain a small degree of autonomy in this 
respect. They can for instance decide whether or not to impose plain packaging, 
which requires a standard colour and font for all tobacco packets in order to limit the 
appeal of the different tobacco brands. Introduced first by Australia, its positive 
effects on tobacco consumption have been well documented74 and it is slowly gaining 
ground in Europe.75 The adoption of this new policy recreates obstacles to the free 
movement of tobacco products and there is no doubt that plain packaging could be 
subjected to harmonisation and generalised at the EU level,76 something that had 
actually been discussed by the Commission during the last revision of the Tobacco 
Products Directive.77 
 
The competence of the EU is therefore quite large when it comes to the 
harmonisation of product requirements. Yet, some of the current measures put in 
place by the Union appear problematic in light of the internal market requirement of 
Article 114 TFEU.78 
 
Minimum and partial harmonisation 
 
The EU legislator resorts to different harmonisation techniques. Full harmonisation 
prevents member States to deviate from the standard fixed at the EU level while 
minimum harmonisation provides for a minimum rule letting member States free to 
set a higher requirement. Partial harmonisation can be said of a situation where the 
EU measure does not apply to all aspects of a given object. It is quite straightforward 
that full harmonisation would be the preferred option under Article 114 TFEU insofar 
it prevents any obstacles or distortions to resurface. Minimum or partial 
harmonisation appear less effective in that respect. The margin let to member States 
to introduce their own rules puts into question the actual removal of obstacles to 
trade or distortions of competition.79  
 
In Tobacco Advertising, the Court based its decision to annul the directive at stake 
partly on its failure to ensure the free movement of products in conformity with its 
provisions.80 Member States were indeed permitted to impose more stringent 
requirements to products in compliance with the directive and refuse access to their 
market on those grounds. In this case, the minimum harmonisation technique used 
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79 See Weinzierl J. and Weissenmayer J., ‘News from minimum harmonisation: how the tobacco 
advertising cases shape the law of the internal market’, (2016), European Law Blog, accessed at: 
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could not lead with any certainty to the removal of obstacles to trade. In subsequent 
cases, such as British American Tobacco, the legislator did include a free movement 
clause, ensuring that products complying with the directive could not be refused 
because of stricter national requirements.81  
 
However, even in such a case, minimum harmonisation can remain problematic. The 
risk of diverging national rules can make the contribution to free movement purely 
hypothetical. In British American Tobacco , the Court had to review the Tobacco 
Products Directive of 2001.82 The directive was setting a minimum size for the health 
warnings to be affixed on packaging,83 while allowing member States to apply more 
stringent requirements. Despite the presence of the free movement clause, the 
contribution to the free circulation of products was merely hypothetical. Indeed, a 
manufacturer from a country imposing larger health warnings would be put at a 
competitive disadvantage against products with smaller warnings.84 This measure 
could therefore not be seen as removing obstacles to free movement or distortions of 
competition.85There appears to be no such issue with the new Tobacco Product 
Directive of 2014 since the size of the different warnings is now expressed as a fixed 
percentage.86 
 
In any case, the future of minimum harmonisation in internal market legislation has 
been rendered uncertain by the recent Philip Morris judgement. In its interpretation of 
Article 24 of the Tobacco Products Directive which states that member States retain 
the right ‘to maintain or introduce further requirements […] in relation to the 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products’,87 the Court decided that this 
possibility could only apply to the aspects of the packaging not harmonised by the 
directive.88 It explicitly said that authorising member States to impose further 
requirements in relation to aspects harmonised by the directive would undermine the 
harmonisation effect and run contrary to Article 114 TFEU.89 This seems to reject the 
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85 Wyatt D., supra note 14, pp. 32-33. 
86 See articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the TPD, supra note 4. 
87 Article 24 of the TPD, supra note 4. 
88 Philip Morris, supra note 6, para 73,78  
89 Ibid., para 71. 
  
possibility of minimum harmonisation.90 The Court accepted that its interpretation 
would not guarantee the free circulation of products that comply with the directive,91 
but considered that such partial harmonisation was compatible with Article 114 TFEU 
since ‘whilst it does not eliminate all obstacles to trade, it does eliminate some.’92 As 
Advocate General Kokott wrote: ‘In the present case, this means, for example, that 
manufacturers of tobacco products throughout the internal market are able to use 
cigarette packets which have a uniform basic design and are required to adapt that 
design to the specificities of their respective national laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions only in certain details (colours, for example), but no longer 
in every respect.’93 While this reasoning is true in the abstract,94 the case-law does 
not specify any substantive threshold for the removal of obstacles to trade, unlike for 
distortions of competition, such a ‘piecemeal’95 approach raises question in practice. 
If the harmonisation of a product was so limited that its marketing in several member 
States would still require separate production processes for the manufacturer, the 
removal of obstacles to trade or appreciable distortions of competition affecting 
production costs would be again quite hypothetical. The presence of economies of 
scale would be far from certain.96 This is reinforced by the fact that certain of the 
provisions of the directive impose divergent rules to member States to take into 
account their different tax legislation and official language(s). In this case, it is the EU 
legislator itself which creates or reinforces the obstacles present in national 
legislations, a problematic point that the Court does not address in its decision.97 
 
If from a health perspective minimum or partial harmonisation can be seen as 
desirable since allowing for regulatory innovation and stronger protection at the 
national level, it is full harmonisation that represents the most effective market-
making tool under Article 114 TFEU. This is a perfect illustration of the schizophrenic 
nature of Article 114 TFEU and the difficulty to reconcile its different objectives. 
 
Bans on products 
 
From the point of view of the internal market, the possibility given to the EU legislator 
to ban the marketing of a product is even more problematic. The Tobacco Products 
Directive prohibits the placing on the market of tobacco products with a 
characterising flavour and tobacco for oral use.98 At the national level, such a ban is 
clearly an obstacle to trade and can therefore be subjected to Union harmonisation.99 
But only scraping the ban would remove the obstacle arising thereof. On the 
contrary, a general ban at the EU level generalise the obstacle. How could then such 
a measure ever be compliant with Article 114 TFEU? 
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The legality of the ban on tobacco for oral use was first discussed in the cases 
Swedish Match100 and Arnold André101, when it was first implemented by Directive 
2001/37. The Court upheld this ban, stating that measures under Article 114 TFUE 
‘may consist in […] provisionally or definitively prohibiting the marketing of a product 
or products’.102 The rationale for such a decision of the Court is not clearly expressed 
in the judgement, but Advocate General Geelhoed defends it in its Opinion as part of 
a wider harmonisation regime.103 The Advocate General reckons that the ban of a 
product cannot be said to improve trading conditions for this product itself,104 but 
considers that such a ban can improve trading conditions for ‘related products’ to the 
extent that it reduces the enforcement costs of the legislation for these products.105 
Yet, this line of reasoning seems hard to sustain. It is difficult to see how banning a 
product reduces the effort to control other products, and most importantly, how this 
can lead to the removal of obstacles for these products from the point of view of the 
manufacturer. 
 
The ban on tobacco with a characterising flavour was discussed more recently in the 
Philip Morris and Poland v European Parliament and Council cases and upheld by 
the Court.106 Here again, the reasoning of the Court does not have much to offer and 
one has to turn to Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion to understand how such a ban 
could be justified. According to her, the ban removes obstacles to trade since it 
‘serves to create uniform trade conditions for all tobacco products throughout the 
European Union’.107 In her view, the ban would not constitute the prohibition of a 
product but merely a restriction of its composition: ‘in other words, tobacco products 
may in principle still be placed on the market in the European Union, but only without 
characterising flavours’.108 This argumentation is more convincing than the one 
developed by Advocate General Geelhoed and could represent a valid justification. 
But in the case at stake, it rests on the dubious premise that tobacco products with or 
without flavour are similar, that they are substitutable from the point of view of the 
consumer. It would mean that someone barred from smoking a menthol cigarette 
would switch to a ‘normal’ cigarette. This is far from obvious and actually goes 
against the very ground for the ban, which is to limit the overall consumption of 
tobacco products.109 If flavoured and neutral products were indeed similar, no 
decrease in consumption could derive from a prohibition of the former. 
 
In the same vein, these EU-wide prohibitions cannot be considered as removing 
appreciable distortions to competition, but rather as generalising a restriction of forms 
of competition, following the reasoning of the Court in Tobacco Advertising.110 
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In both cases, tobacco for oral use and tobacco with a characterising flavour, the 
legislator has set up ‘destructive’ bans.111 These do not help improve trading 
conditions for any class of products by removing obstacles to trade but rather 
removes any possibility for trade in the product concerned. This situation must be 
distinguished from ‘constructive bans’ which are introduced within the same class of 
products and can indeed serve to create uniform trading conditions for this 
product.112 As expressed powerfully by Derrick Wyatt: ‘the Community lawmaker has 
no legitimate interest in the banning of free standing products. […] Action at the 
Community level makes no contribution to the internal market in fact; it simply asserts 
Community competence for the sake of an abstract principle; the principle that in a 
single market it is central authority which decides which products or services may be 
placed on that market.’113 It is, though, this abstract principle that Advocate General 
Gellhoed defends when he writes that ‘the primary goal of the internal market 
provisions of the EC Treaty that one single market appear, that is not fragmented by 
divergent national rules. This goal does not have as a consequence that all possible 
products can be sold on that market, even if they harm the health of users.’114 
 
Advertising 
 
Restrictions on the advertising of tobacco are an important part of the regulator’s tool 
kit, both at the European and the national levels. The first ban on television 
advertising for tobacco products was introduced by the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive115 and was confirmed by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.116 In 
addition, the Tobacco Advertising Directive provides for the prohibition of tobacco 
advertising in the press, in printed publications and on radio, the prohibition of 
sponsorship of radio programmes by tobacco undertakings and of sponsorship of 
events having a cross-border dimension, such as sport events.117 The EU has been 
particularly active on this issue.  
 
Rules on advertising can be considered as obstacles to trade under Article 114 
TFEU, as expressed by the first and second Tobacco Advertising judgements,118 and 
restrictions to the free movement of goods and services under Articles 34 and 56 
TFEU. These rules appear as obstacles/restrictions from different point of views.119 If 
a Member State prohibits the advertising of tobacco in magazines and on television, 
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this is an impediment to the free circulation of foreign magazines bearing this type of 
advertisement120 or to the freedom of movement of television programmes.121 It is 
also a restriction to the free circulation of the product being advertised, which may 
find more difficult to penetrate a foreign market without resorting to promotion.122 It is 
finally also a restriction towards the providers of advertising services themselves.123 
These distinctions are crucial to analyse whether or not an advertising ban at the 
Union level can effectively remove obstacles to trade. 
 
The various prohibitions on tobacco advertising enacted by the EU do not raise any 
concerns as to their legality since these can facilitate the free circulation of the 
support to which they are associated.124 They are constructive bans. While 
prohibiting the advertising activity and hence arguably creating obstacles to trade 
from the point of view of advertisers and tobacco manufacturers, they also facilitate 
the cross-border movement of magazines or audiovisual programmes by removing 
the differences in legislation that affects them. 
 
On the other hand, the prohibition of more static forms of advertising, such as posters 
or advertising spots in cinemas, is not possible at the EU level since it would not 
remove obstacles for any of the actors involved.125 Contrary to press or audiovisual 
products, billboards or movie theatres are indeed not mobile once they are built. 
Diverging advertising rules between member States can therefore not affect their free 
circulation. Furthermore, and as pointed by the Court in the Tobacco Advertising 
judgement,126 differences in advertising regulation between member states cannot in 
this case be considered as appreciable distortions of competition. 
 
Smoke-free environments127 
 
Creating smoke-free environments is intended to protect non-smokers from second-
hand smoking and to ‘de-normalise’ the use of tobacco, ‘the bans, by creating an 
environment where smoking becomes increasingly difficult, help shift social norms 
away from the acceptance of smoking in everyday life and promote public rejections 
of cigarettes’.128 Smoking bans usually concern public places: schools, hospitals, 
workplaces or bars and restaurant. 
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Rules on smoke-free environments vary greatly in their scope and intensity among 
member States. Bars and restaurant are not always covered and bans can be total or 
partial, in which case smoking remain allowed in designated areas.129 The EU has 
not adopted any binding rules on the matter, the only instrument currently in force 
being a Council Recommendation of 2009 recommending that member States 
‘provide effective protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor workplaces, 
indoor public places, public transport and, as appropriate, other public places’. Article 
114 TFEU, as it stands, does not permit the EU to adopt any harmonisation measure 
that would reinforce smoking bans throughout the Union.130 
 
Rules on smoke-free environments could eventually be considered as obstacles if a 
parallel was drawn with the case-law of the Court of Justice on the rules applicable to 
the use of a product. By restricting the use of a given product, these rules make its 
purchase less interesting for consumers and can therefore restrict the access of 
foreign products to the market in which they are enacted.131 To be caught by Article 
34 TFEU, these rules must yet to have a ‘considerable influence’132 on the behaviour 
of consumers, which suggests the existence of some sort of threshold in the Court’s 
appraisal.133 A very comprehensive smoking ban, including for instance the streets, 
could arguably have a considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers and be 
considered as on obstacle to trade. It is at least the objective of such a policy. But the 
European legislator would then only be competent under Article 114 TFEU to remove 
this obstacle and to scrap the ban. Indeed, an EU-wide smoking ban would not 
remove the obstacle but generalise it. The logic here is similar to the one developed 
for the ban on products. 
 
As to the distortions of competition, it is difficult to argue in this case that differences 
in member States’ legislations create any distortions of competition between tobacco 
manufacturers at all, as these legislations have a similar effect on domestic and 
foreign products, in law or in fact. 
 
Selling arrangements 
 
The last category of anti-tobacco policies in discussion here can be qualified as 
‘selling arrangements’, borrowing from the Court’s words in Keck. These rules affect 
the time, place and techniques of sale and are particularly present in the context of 
tobacco regulation: specific opening times for tobacco retailers, restrictions on the 
places of sale, prohibition of vending machines, etc. In France, tobacco may for 
instance only be sold by specific shops under a strict license system134 and vending 
machines are prohibited.135 Regarding these rules, which are closely linked to the 
socio-economic context of each Member State, no EU legislation has been adopted. 
The Commission had considered a ban on tobacco vending machines, later 
abandoned over subsidiary concerns, during the revision of the Tobacco Products 
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Directive.136 It is however hard to see how the EU would have the competence to do 
so. If one keeps in mind the Keck decision and its latter development, a prohibition 
on vending machines at the national level applicable to all products does not seem to 
impose a different burden in law or in fact on foreign products137 or substantially 
restricts their access to the market,138 and hence does not constitute an obstacle to 
trade. Of course, this position would change if one follows Gareth Davies’ approach 
according to which selling arrangement under Article 34 TFEU should fall within the 
scope of Article 114 TFEU.139 But in any case, even if such a rule were considered to 
be an obstacle, an extension of this rule at the EU level would not remove the 
obstacle but reinforce it. Furthermore, for the reasons already exposed above, it is 
also unlikely that differences in laws concerning the availability of vending machines 
would qualify as appreciable distortions of competition. Here again, the legislator 
finds itself limited by the constraints of Article 114 TFEU. 
 
Another kind of regulation that can be assimilated to a selling arrangement is the 
retail display ban for tobacco products, which require stores to keep the products 
invisible to the consumer inside their premises, in order to limit their appeal. These 
bans could possibly be qualified as obstacles from the point of view of the tobacco 
manufacturers. The argument could be made that these bans have an adverse effect 
on imported products compared to domestic products, following the logic developed 
in the case-law of the Court.140 The EFTA Court pointed in that direction in a recent 
judgement concerning the display ban introduced by Norway.141 Yet, the display of 
tobacco products is also a static form of advertising and a ban at the EU level would 
therefore not meet the requirement of Article 114 TFEU.142 For the reasons outlined 
above, it would not help removing obstacles to trade or appreciable distortions of 
competition.143 
 
A limitation of public health in the name of the market  
 
Going through the various policies enacted by the European Union and the member 
States, it appears that the Union legislator is severely limited by the internal market 
objective contained in Article 114 TFEU. If product requirements and certain 
advertising rules are good candidates for EU action, which may explain why they 
have already been largely regulated, other aspects of tobacco policy seem out of the 
Union’s reach. 
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3. Conclusion : The tobacco paradox 
 
‘Although pursuing a public health goal by promoting--rather than restricting--the free 
movement of cigarettes in Europe might appear somehow paradoxical, this is the 
legal logic that has dominated and continues to dominate the EU regulatory approach 
to tobacco.’144 While this logic has enabled the EU to be an ambitious actor in the 
fight against tobacco consumption, it still suffers major flaws, as this contribution has 
sought to demonstrate. The competence of the EU is entangled in what very much 
resembles a paradox. The current legal framework allows at the same time for too 
much and too little. 
 
On a constitutional point of view, and with the logic of the Lisbon Treaty in mind, the 
existence of such an extensive body of rules on tobacco appears at first sight as a 
clear violation of the principle of conferral. The EU was not conferred any substantial 
power on the matter. Article 114 TFEU does provide a solid legal basis for 
harmonising national rules in public health, but it does so in complete incoherence 
with the Treaties system. Internal market legislation may not be ‘a perverse ploy of 
European actors seeking to extend the range of their competences’,145 but is used 
with a certain degree of dishonesty by member States to compensate for a lack of 
competence upon which they decided themselves. It is of course not to the Court to 
narrow down the scope of Article 114 TFEU, internal market legislation is necessary 
and must integrate non-market interests, but rather to member States to rethink the 
current competence framework to bring it more clarity and predictability. 
 
On a public health point of view however, the competence given to the EU by Article 
114 TFEU appears insufficient. Under the current interpretation of the Court, a 
number of meaningful actions are not available to the EU legislator for lack of 
contribution to the establishment and functioning of the internal market. This limit can 
be particularly felt in cases where the Court renounces to apply correctly its own 
case-law, possibly by reluctance to rule in favour of tobacco companies by striking 
down important public health measures. These shortcomings in the EU’s 
competence will hamper future developments in tobacco policy and for other aspects 
of lifestyle risks, such as alcohol and unhealthy diets, which are not as heavily 
regulated at the moment.146 This can be deplored considering the challenges posed 
by lifestyle risks and their direct role in the growing burden of non-communicable 
diseases in the European Union and worldwide, and considering also the fact that EU 
tobacco policy seem to enjoy a broad support from member States147 and citizens.148 
 
A softening of the Court’s appraisal of what constitutes a contribution to the internal 
market is possible and could very well unlock some of the possibilities outlined 
above.149 It is not, however, the preferred option, since it would deprive Article 114 
TFEU of any meaningful limits and would not solve the overarching discrepancies in 
the competence framework. To bring in line the legislative practice with this 
framework and to give the Union full latitude to regulate lifestyle risks, a change to 
the Treaty would be required. This could take various forms, from removing the 
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harmonisation ban from Article 168(5) and moving public health from complementary 
to shared competences, to a more radical overhaul in the form of general legislative 
competence given to the EU.150 The latter solution would have the merit to address 
the global ‘competence conundrum’, with some obvious political hurdles and legal 
discussions facing on the way.151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
150 Garben, S., supra note 21. 
151 Ibid.  
  
 
European Legal Studies 
Etudes Juridiques Européennes 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPERS IN LAW 
 
 
1/2003, Dominik Hanf et Tristan Baumé, “Vers une clarification de la répartition des 
compétences entre l'Union et ses Etats Membres? Une analyse du projet d'articles 
du Présidium de la Convention”. 
 
2/2003, Dominik Hanf, “Der Prozess der europäischen Integration in Belgien. 
Voraussetzung und Rahmen der Föderalisiserung eines ehemaligen Einheitsstaats”. 
 
3/2003, Dominik Hanf, “Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional 
reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice”. 
 
4/2003, Horst Dippel, “Conventions in Comparative Constitutional Law”. 
 
5/2003, Ludwig Krämer, “Access to Environmental Information in an Open European 
Society - Directive 2003/4”. 
 
6/2003, Ludwig Krämer, “Uberlegungen zu Ressourceneffizienz und Recycling”. 
 
7/2003, Ludwig Krämer, “The Genesis of EC Environmental Principles”. 
 
8/2003, Takis Tridimas, “The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A 
Supreme Court for the Union?”. 
 
1/2004, Dominik Hanf et Pablo Dengler, “Accords d’association”. 
 
2/2004, David Mamane, “Reform der EU-Wettbewerbsregeln für Technologietransfer-
Verträge: Einfahrt in den sicheren Hafen?”. 
 
3/2004, Donald Slater and Denis Waelbroeck, “Meeting Competition : Why it is not  
an Abuse under Article 82”. 
 
4/2004, Jacques Bourgeois and Tristan Baumé, “Decentralisation of EC Competition 
Law Enforcement and General Principles of Community Law”. 
 
5/2004, Rostane Mehdi, “Brèves observations sur la consécration constitutionnelle 
d’un droit de retrait volontaire”. 
 
1/2005, Jacques Pelkmans, “Subsidiarity between Law and Economics”. 
 
2/2005, Koen Lenaerts, “The Future Organisation of the European Courts”. 
 
3/2005, John A.E. Vervaele, “The Europeanisation of Criminal Law and the Criminal 
Law Dimension of European Integration”. 
 
  
4/2005, Christine Reh and Bruno Scholl, “The Convention on the Future of Europe: 
Extended Working Group or Constitutional Assembly?” 
 
5/2005, John A.E. Vervaele, “European Criminal Law and General Principles of 
Union Law”. 
 
6/2005, Dieter Mahncke, “From Structure to Substance: Has the Constitutional Treaty 
improved the Chances for a Common Foreign and Security Policy?”. 
 
1/2006, Dominik Hanf, “Le développement de la citoyenneté de l’Union européenne”. 
 
2/2006, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, Thien Uyen Do, “The Case Law of the ECJ concerning 
the Free Provision of Services : 2000 – 2005”. 
 
3/2006, Dominik Hanf, “Réformes institutionnelles sans révision du traité?”, 
(document de discussion). 
 
4/2006, Elise Muir, “Enhancing the effects of EC law on national labour markets, the 
Mangold case”. 
 
5/2006, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Why the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is bad 
for you: a letter to the EU”. 
 
6/2006, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “The EU essential facilities doctrine”. 
 
7/2006, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, “Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and 
Market Power in the Media Sector”. 
 
1/2007, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, “The Italian Merck Case”. 
 
2/2007, Imelda Maher, “Exploitative Abuses: Which Competition Policy, Which Public 
Policy?”. 
 
3/2007, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “With or without you... judging politically in the field of 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?”. 
 
4/2007, Matteo Pierangelo Negrinotti, “The AstraZeneca Case”. 
 
5/2007, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Que reste-t-il de la directive sur les services?”. 
 
6/2007, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for 
services”. 
 
7/2007, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Current Problems of Social Europe”. 
 
1/2008, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Public Procurement and State Aid in National 
Healthcare Systems”. 
 
2/2008, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the 
Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty”. 
 
3/2008, Takis Tridimas and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, “EU Law, International Law and 
Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress?”. 
 
  
4/2008, Ludwig Krämer, “Environmental judgments by the Court of Justice and their 
duration”. 
 
5/2008, Donald Slater, Sébastien Thomas and Denis Waelbroeck, “Competition law 
proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for 
reform?”. 
 
1/2009, Inge Govaere, “The importance of International Developments in the case-
law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order”. 
 
2/2009, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Le principe de reconnaissance muTEUlle dans la libre 
prestation de services”. 
 
3/2009, Dominik Hanf, "L'encadrement constitutionnel de l'appartenance de 
l'Allemagne à l'Union européenne. L'apport de l’arrêt « Lisbonne » de la Cour 
constitutionnelle fédérale". 
 
1/2010, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Liberalising trade in services: creating new migration 
opportunities?” 
 
2/2010, Vassilis Hatzopoulos & Hélène Stergiou, “Public Procurement Law and 
Health care: From Theory to Practice”  
 
3/2010, Dominik Hanf, “Vers une précision de la Europarechtsfreundlichkeit de la Loi 
fondamentale - L’apport de l’arrêt « rétention des données » et de la décision 
« Honeywell » du BVerfG” 
 
1/2011, Nicoleta Tuominen, “Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry 
– Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy” 
 
2/2011, Dominik Hanf, “The ENP in the light of the new “neighbourhood clause” 
(Article 8 TEU)” 
 
3/2011, Slawomir Bryska, “In-house lawyers of NRAs may not represent their clients 
before the European Court of Justice - A case note on UKE (2011)” 
 
4/2011, Ann Fromont et Christophe Verdure, “La consécration du critère de l’« accès 
au marché » au sein de la libre circulation des marchandises : mythe ou réalité ?” 
 
5/2011, Luca Schicho, “Legal privilege for in-house lawyers in the light of AKZO: a 
matter of law or policy?”  
 
6/2011, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “The concept of ‘economic activity’ in the EU Treaty: 
From ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts” 
 
1/2012, Koen Lenaerts, “The European Court of Justice and Process-oriented 
Review” 
 
2/2012, Luca Schicho, “Member State BITs after the Treaty of Lisbon: Solid 
Foundation or First Victims of EU Investment Policy?” 
 
  
3/2012, Jeno Czuczai, “The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making 
activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most 
recent practice” 
 
4/2012, Ben Smulders and Katharina Eisele, “Reflections on the Institutional 
Balance, the Community Method and the Interplay between Jurisdictions after 
Lisbon” 
 
5/2012, Christian Calliess, “The Future of the Eurozone and the Role of the German 
Constitutional Court” 
 
1/2013, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “La justification des atteintes aux libertés de 
circulation : cadre méthodologique et spécificités matérielles” 
 
2/2013, George Arestis, “Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the 
Luxembourg perspective” 
 
3/2013, George Nicolaou, “The Strasbourg View on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights” 
 
4/2013, Jean Sentenac, “L’autorisation inconditionnelle en phase II - De 
l’imperfection du règlement 139/2004” 
 
5/2013, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Authorisations under EU internal market rules”  
 
6/2013, Pablo González Pérez, “Le contrôle européen des concentrations et les 
leçons à tirer de la crise financière et économique” 
 
7/2013, Michal Bobek & David Kosař, “Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical 
Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe” 
 
8/2013, Pablo González de Zárate Catón, “Disclosure of Leniency Materials: A 
Bridge between Public and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law”  
 
9/2013, Gianni Lo Schiavo, “The Judicial ‘Bail Out’ of the European Stability 
Mechanism: Comment on the Pringle Case. Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. 
Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, [2012] not yet reported” 
 
1/2014, Ramses A. Wessel and Steven Blockmans, “The Legal Status and Influence 
of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union” 
 
2/2014, Michal Bobek, “The Court of Justice of the European Union” 
 
3/2014, Michal Bobek, “Judicial Selection, Lay Participation, and Judicial Culture in 
the Czech Republic: A Study in a Central European (Non)Transformation” 
 
1/2015, Frédéric Allemand, “La Banque centrale européenne et la nouvelle 
gouvernance économique européenne : le défi de l’intégration différenciée“  
 
1/2016, Inge Govaere, “TTIP and Dispute Settlement: Potential Consequences for 
the  Autonomous EU Legal Order” 
 
  
2/2016, Gareth Davies, “Migrant Union Citizens and Social Assistance: Trying to Be 
Reasonable About Self-Sufficiency” 
 
3/2016, Miguel Ángel de Diego Martín, “Net Neutrality: Smart Cables or Dumb 
Pipes? An overview on the regulatory debate about how to govern the network” 
 
4/2016, Inge Govaere, “To Give or to Grab: The Principle of Full, Crippled and Split 
Conferral of Powers Post-Lisbon” 
 
1/2017, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “From Economic Crisis to Identity Crisis: The 
Spoliation of EU and National Citizenships” 
 
1/2018, Vincent Delhomme, “Between Market Integration and Public Health:  
The Paradoxical EU Competence to Regulate Tobacco Consumption” 
 
